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Our minds, constituted by conscious experiences, are both the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives. Despite the 
large amount of clinical evidence suggesting an intimate relationship between the brain function and the mind, the nature of this 
relationship remains poorly understood. In this Commentary we discuss some of the problems faced by the classical mind-brain 
identity theory and explain how the quantum dualistic interactionism proposed by Sir John Eccles could resolve these problems. 
Biomed Rev 2011; 22: 81-84.
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MIND-BRAIN PROBLEM IN CLASSICAL PHYSICS
Our minds are constituted by subjective conscious experiences 
through which we access ourselves and the surrounding world. 
Examples of conscious experiences are the pain of the tooth-
ache, the smell of the rose, or the perceived blueness of the 
blue sky. Large amount of clinical evidence suggests that there 
is an intimate relationship between the brain function and the 
mind, because discrete lesions in the brain could impair our 
cognitive abilities and change the way we experience the world 
(1). Thus it is clear that our minds should depend somehow 
on the brain states. Nevertheless, this is the best that classical 
materialism can say on the subject. Asking further questions 
within the framework of classical materialism leads to para-
doxical conclusions, which contradict experimental observa-
tions and our common sense. Several important questions are:
(i) How the mind can affect the physical brain?
(ii) How can we have free will if we cannot choose between 
several alternatives?
(iii) How can we be responsible for our actions if our choices 
are predetermined?
(iv) Why the brain processes produce any experiences at all?
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(v) Why during anesthesia the brain processes do not pro-
duce experiences?
According to classical materialism all brain processes can 
be reduced to molecular chains of causes and effects, which 
although immensely complex operate as a deterministic clock-
work mechanism (2). Because the material world is causally 
closed, if the brain states produce conscious experiences, then 
these experiences cannot be causally effective. According to 
the evolution theory however, something that is not causally 
effective cannot lead to evolutionary advantage and cannot be 
selected by natural selection. The mind-brain identity theory is 
an attempt to resolve this problem. It postulates that the mind 
states are brain states, which makes the mind states causally 
effective and capable of providing evolutionary advantage. The 
proposed solution however comes at a dear price. Because the 
mind-brain identity theory is based on classical materialism, 
the brain dynamics is completely deterministic. Therefore, the 
mind-brain choices are predetermined and there is no room 
for free will or choice making. If we cannot make choices we 
cannot be morally responsible for our actions, no more than 
a falling stone is morally responsible for breaking one’s leg. 
Furthermore, by attributing mental properties to the material 
brain states, it is not easy to explain why there are brain pro-
cesses that do not produce conscious experiences. For example, 
during general anesthesia, the conscious experience is safely 
erased, yet, an experimentalist can flash light into the eye of 
an anesthetized animal and still record evoked potentials from 
pyramidal neurons in the primary visual cortex (3). If mind 
states are identical to brain states, it should be impossible to 
turn them on or off using anesthetics, because the brain states 
always remain brain states. 
In a Dance Round in this volume of Biomedical Reviews, 
it was suggested that the mind-brain identity thesis applies 
to “events of sensations” and “distributed processes in the 
brain” (4). Such a definition however is vacuous. There are 
various distributed processes in the brain that do not produce 
conscious experiences. Furthermore, the events of sensations 
are by definition mental and to say that conscious experiences 
are associated with brain states or processes that produce sensa-
tion is circular. One might be tempted to identify the events of 
sensations with the electrophysiological processes of inputting 
sensory information from the sense organs to the cortex, but 
certainly the latter processes are not always associated with 
sensory experiences as can be seen from the provided example 
with recording of visually evoked potentials from pyramidal 
neurons in the primary sensory cortex of anesthetized animals 
(3). Experiments with similar results were performed also in 
anesthetized human patients using auditory stimulation and 
EEG recording (5).
MIND-BRAIN PROBLEM IN QUANTUM PHYSICS
The ease with which one can construct arguments contradict-
ing experimental observations and our common sense does 
not solely result from the postulated mind-brain identity. 
Instead, the roots of the problem lie within the causally closed 
deterministic structure of classical materialism. Fortunately, in 
1920’s with the birth of quantum mechanics, which describes 
the behavior of elementary physical particles, it became clear 
that classical materialism is not a correct description of the 
physical world. The behavior of elementary physical particles 
was found to be inherently indeterministic so that one cannot 
predict exactly the future state of an individual particle, only 
the probability with which given future state could occur. The 
dynamics of individual quantum particles is governed by a 
wavefunction ψ, which is obtained by solving the Schrödinger 
equation (6). The wavefunction ψ depends on the boundary 
conditions that include the initial position of the particle and 
its environment. If one knows the boundary conditions, one 
can solve the Schrödinger equation and see how the wave-
function ψ evolves in a deterministic way through space and 
time. What makes the theory extraordinary is the fact that the 
wavefunction ψ of a quantum system cannot be observed. The 
wavefunction ψ is sometimes described as pre-probability 
because it is the square of the wavefunction |ψ|2 that gives the 
probability to find the quantum particle at a certain position at 
a certain time (7). Curiously, the wavefunction ψ is defined in 
a non-material multi-dimensional Hilbert space, in which each 
axis represents a possible state of the quantum particle. If the 
quantum particle can be in infinite number of possible states, 
the Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional (8,9). The indetermin-
ism in quantum mechanics stems from the fact that when the 
particle interacts with other particles only one of the possible 
states is actualized. After the interaction the new position of the 
particle and its new environment will serve as new boundary 
conditions for solving the Schrödinger equation and obtaining 
new wavefunction ψ. The new wavefunction ψ will evolve 
again in a deterministic way through space and time until the 
next interaction, during which one of the multiple possibilities 
will be actualized with the square of the new wavefunction 
|ψ|2 providing the probability to find the quantum particle at a 
certain position at a certain time. Undoubtedly such behavior 
of the elementary physical particles may look disturbing and 
incomprehensible at first encounter. Richard Feynman, who 
won the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physics for his work on quantum 
electrodynamics, repeatedly stressed that nobody understands 
how the real world can be like this (10). And when asked 
whether he likes the weird quantum laws, he answered that it 
is irrelevant what he likes or dislikes, the important thing is 
how the physical world is. The predictions of quantum theory 
are currently confirmed with such a high degree of precision 
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that there is little doubt that quantum theory is the correct 
physical description of the world. Sir John Eccles, who won 
the 1963 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work 
on the synapse, was one of the first who understood the im-
portance of quantum mechanics for resolving the mind-brain 
problem, and proposed that mental events can cause brain 
events analogously to how the wavefunction ψ determines the 
probability |ψ|2 for a given quantum particle to be found at a 
certain position at a certain time (11). Indeed if one considers 
the wavefunction ψ of a quantum particle as a non-observable 
mental state of pre-probabilities and the actualized position 
in space and time as an observable material state, then the 
dualistic interactionism proposed by Sir John Eccles is con-
sistent with the modern vision of what the physical world is. 
Interestingly, in quantum mechanics a system of interacting 
quantum particles can have a wavefunction ψ satisfying the 
Schrödinger equation, whereas the individual particles in the 
composite system may not have individual wavefunctions ψ. 
Such state does not have a classical analogue, and is referred 
to as a quantum entangled state (9). If the human mind could 
be described by a global wavefunction ψ that results from 
quantum entanglement of different brain subcomponents, each 
of which does not have an individual wavefunction ψ, then one 
sees that it would be incorrect to say that the mind represented 
by the global wavefunction ψ is composed of simpler minds. 
Furthermore, in dualistic interactionism general anesthesia and 
loss of consciousness should not be understood simply as turn-
ing off the mental states. Instead following the analogy with 
split-brain patients, who have two independent minds in each 
cerebral hemisphere due to surgically severed corpus callosum 
(12), one can assume that anesthetic molecules disrupt the in-
teractions and the quantum entanglements between individual 
brain molecules leading to zillion split-brain subcomponents, 
each of which possessing the simplest mental states available 
to individual quantum particles. Thus consciousness would 
not emerge out of nothing and would not disintegrate down to 
nothing. In its essence the dualism affirms that consciousness 
can have different level of complexity with simplest mental 
properties attributable to all elementary quantum particles.
The conceptual difference between the dualistic interaction-
ism based on quantum mechanics, and alternative versions of 
dualism based on classical materialism, such as epiphenom-
enalism or psychophysic parallelism, is shown in Figure 1. 
Because quantum laws are indeterministic it is possible to 
construct a theory in which the mind and brain states interact: 
the brain state produces deterministically a mind state after 
which the mind state makes an indeterministic choice from 
multiple possible alternatives and selects a future brain state. 
This is in stark contrast with classical materialism where 
the brain states obey causally closed deterministic laws. In 
epiphenomenalism, the brain states produce the mental states 
but these mental states are unable to affect causally the brain 
states. The epiphenomenal mental states are just useless specta-
tors. Even more ridiculous is the psychophysical parallelism 
where the brain states and the mental states do not interact at 
all, but which are set in a pre-established harmony created by 
a divine creator.
Figure 1. Varieties of dualist causal interaction. Dualist in-
teractionism affirms that brain states produce mental states, 
which may in turn select the future brain states. Epiphenom-
enalism affirms that brain states produce mental states, which 
do not affect causally the brain states. Psychophysic parallel-
ism affirms that brain states and mental states do not interact 
with each other but are set in a pre-established harmony cre-
ated by a divine creator. B1, B2, B3, brain states; M1, M2, M3, 
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CONCLUSIONS
In a Dance Round in this BMR volume, it was stated that dual-
ism is “undeniably suspended with the data of neuroscience” 
and that “besides Sir John Eccles more than forty years ago, 
there is no other scientist from the field of empirical science 
to any more hold the position of dualism” (4). While any form 
of dualism based on classical materialism can be considered 
refuted, it is not true that dualism in general is refuted and 
that no present scientist holds such position. Currently, an 
increasing number of neuroscientists and physicists think 
that quantum theory could support dualist interactionism 
along the lines envisaged by Sir John Eccles. Attestation for 
that are the plethora of recent models based on the nanoscale 
organization of the neurons in which the mind states can af-
fect the brain through quantum effects (13-19). Some support 
for the feasibility of such quantum models has been already 
provided by the experimental verification of quantum tunneling 
for hydrogen transfer in enzyme-catalyzed reactions (20-22), 
quantum quasi-particle assisted folding of proteins (23) and 
microsecond quantum coherence in the retina of some birds 
that are able to navigate by sensing Earth’s magnetic field (24). 
The dualist interactionism envisaged by Sir John Eccles is not 
only viable, it could be our best bet for a physical theory of 
consciousness.
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